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"WHAT'S GOOD IS BAD, WHAT'S BAD IS GOOD, YOU'LL
FIND OUT WHEN YOU REACH THE TOP, YOU'RE ON THE
BOTTOM": ARE THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT (AND OLMSTEAD V L.C.) ANYTHING MORE THAN
"IDIOT WIND?"
Michael L. Perlin*
Mental disability law is contaminated by "sanism, " an irrational prejudice simi-
lar to such other irrational prejudices as racism and sexism. The passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)-a statute that focused specifically on
questions of stereotyping and stigma-appeared at first to offer an opportunity to
deal frontally with sanist attitudes and, optimally, to restructure the way that
citizens with mental disabilities were dealt with by the remainder of society. How-
ever, in its first decade, the ADA did not prove to be a panacea for such persons.
The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C.-ruling that the ADA
entitled certain state hospital residents to treatment in an "integrated community
setting, " and stressing that "unjustified isolation ... is properly regarded as dis-
crimination based on disability "-appeared to have the potential to transform
and revolutionize mental disability law. This Article questions whether
Olmstead has done that, and whethe, in fact, it has the capacity to do that.
Furthermore, a review of post-Olmstead caselaw-a universe that is "pretty pal-
lid"-and the meager (in volume) scholarship, conclude that, in spite of
Olmstead, "there are still many sanist attitudes that need to be undone."
INTRODUCTION
I began advocating on behalf of persons with mental disabilities
in 1971, first on an occasional basis, then as part of my work with
the New Jersey office of the Public Defender. Three years later, I
began working full-time as the director of the New Jersey Division
of Mental Health Advocacy in the New Jersey Department of the
Public Advocate. This division was the nation's first state-wide,
cabinet-level public interest advocacy office.' As a result of my ex-
periences, I first wrote and spoke to national audiences about
* Professor, New York Law School. A.B. 1966, Rutgers University;J.D. 1969, Columbia
Law School. The author wishes to thank jenna Anderson for her excellent research assis-
tance.
1. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, MENTAL PATIENT ADVOCACY BY A PUBLIC ADVOCATE, 54
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169 (1982); Stanley C. Van Ness & Michael L. Perlin, Mental Health Advocacy:
The New Jersey Experience, in Mental Health Advocacy: An Emerging Force in Consumers'
Rights 62 (Louis E. Kopolow et al. eds., 1977).
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mental disability law in 1975,2 and began teaching it full-time in
1984.
In 1990, I turned my scholarly attention to questions of sanism.
3
"Sanism" is defined as an irrational prejudice towards mentally ill
persons, which is of the same quality and character as other irra-
tional prejudices. Such other prejudices are reflected in prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.4
As I recently wrote:
Sanism is as insidious as other "isms" and is, in some ways,
more troubling, because it is (a) largely invisible, (b) largely
socially acceptable, and (c) frequently practiced (consciously
and unconsciously) by individuals who regularly take "liberal"
or "progressive" positions decrying similar biases and preju-
dices that involve sex, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. It
is a form of bigotry that "responsible people can express in
public." Like other "isms," sanism is based largely upon stereo-
type, myth, superstition and deindividualization. To sustain
and perpetuate it, we use prereflective "ordinary common
sense" and other cognitive-simplifying devices such as heuris-
tic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in
everyday life and in the legal process....
The practicing bar, courts, legislatures, professional psychiat-
ric and psychological associations, and the scholarly academy
are all largely silent about sanism. A handful of practitioners,
lawmakers, scholars and judges have raised lonely voices, but
the topic is simply "off the agenda" for most of these groups.
As a result, individuals with mental disabilities ... are fre-
quently marginalized to an even greater extent than are
others who fit within the Carolene Products definition of "dis-
crete and insular minorities."5
It is impossible to understand developments in mental disability
law or to coherently construct any overarching mental disability law
theory without recognizing the insidious and corrosive power and
2. Michael L. Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Law Setting, 3 BULL. Am. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 143 (1975).
3. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON
TRIAL (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE].
4. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REv. 373 (1992) [hereinafter
Perlin, Sanism].
5. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
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impact of sanism. In a book and series of articles,7 I have consid-
ered questions of involuntary civil commitment law," of institutional
rights,9 of the right to refuse treatment,' ° deinstitutionalization,"
criminal incompetencies, the insanity defense, 3 Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 4 and the death penalty.'5 I believe understanding
the inconsistencies, ambiguities, and internal contradictions in any
of these areas of the law requires coming to terms with the power
and force of sanism.
Over two decades ago, the Supreme Court stressed the "adverse
social consequences" associated with commitment to a mental
hospital, and declared that "[w]hether we label this phenomena
'stigma' or choose to call it something else ... we recognize that it
can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the
6. See id.; Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Preudice Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality,
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3
(1999) [hereinafter Perlin, Half-Wracked]; Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the
Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them," 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 775
(1998).
7. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3; Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success
Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1247 (1998) [hereinafter Perlin, Success]; Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients
and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.YU. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
517 (1993-94) [hereinafter Perlin, Right to Sex]; Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse
Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A.
Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47 (1993).
8. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 79-112.
9. See, e.g., id. at 113-24.
10. See, e.g., id. at 125-56; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than
"Dodging Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial
Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 114 (1996)
[hereinafter Perlin & Dorfman, Dodging Lions].
11. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story
of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 91-93 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Marginalization].
12. See, e.g., Perlin, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 205-22; Michael L. Perlin, "Dig-
nity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Tial of Mentally Disabled
Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996).
13. See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 323-42; MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 385-90 (1994) [hereinafter PERLIN, JURIS-
PRUDENCE]; Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me". The Insanity
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IoWA L. REV.
1375 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Borderline].
14. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and theFederal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 Am.J. CRIM. L. 431 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of
Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1996); Michael L.
Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental
Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL. 239 (1994) [hereinafter Perlin,
Sanist Lives].
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
individual."'6 Underlying sanism's power is the malignancy of
stigma. AsJohn Parry and Eric Drogin wrote:
Stigma affects the law in at least two ways: (1) the negative ef-
fect on the liberty interests of the person with a mental
disability who is the subject of a legal proceeding and (2) po-
tential bias due to sanism that judges and other courtroom
17participants may demonstrate towards that person.
The stigma that accompanies mental illness has been character-
ized by one state supreme court as "carr[ying] with it a stigma
similar to that associated with a criminal record,"8 and likened by
another court to the stigma that attaches to "dishonesty... serious
felony ... [or] manifest racism."' 9 A diagnosis of mental illness car-
ries with it legal disabilities as well as social stigmatization. 20 Surveys
show that mental disabilities are the most negatively perceived of all
disabilities.' Individuals with mental disabilities are denied jobs, re-
fused access to apartments in public housing or entry to places in
public accommodation, and turned down for participation in pub-
licly-funded programs because they appear "strange" or "different."
22
Behavioral myths have emerged suggesting that persons with mental
disabilities are deviant, worth less than "normal" individuals, are dis-
proportionately dangerous, and are presumptively incompetent.
22
24Courts regularly issue sanist opinions. In 1960, the Iowa Su-
preme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
16. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S 480, 492 (1980) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
425-26 (1979)).
17. JOHN PARRY & ERIC DROGIN, CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 5 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
18. Nelson v. Ferguson, 399 S.E.2d 909,913 (W Va. 1990).
19. Green v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 911 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Harrison v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 1505, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
20. State v. Bean, 762 A.2d 1259, 1265 (Vt. 2000).
21. Michael L. Perlin, "I Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No More": Institutional Segrega-
tion, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
53, 63 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Maggie's Farm].
22. Id. at 63-64 (citing Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: An
Overview, 22 N.M. L. REv. 13, 16-17 (1992)).
23. Id. at 64. See, e.g., Perlin, Sanism, supra note 4, at 393-97 (citing, inter alia, SANDER
GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS
(1985)); Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally Ill Patients'Abilities to
Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for Medication, 15 l-Aw & HUM. BEHAV. 377, 385-86
(1991); Linda Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Dangerous Misconception, 142 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 593, 597-98 (1985).
24. See generally PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3. For examples of sanism in
insanity defense decision making, see PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 387-90
(discussing, inter alia, State v. Zmich, 770 P.2d 776 (Ariz. 1989), People v. DeAndo, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 830 (App. 1980), People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), and State v.
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Clause did not protect the loss of liberty resulting from involuntary
civil commitment. 1 In 1976, in a case involving a state law requiring
mandatory retirement for certain police officers at age 50, the Su-
preme Court rejected plaintiff's equal protection argument:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those
who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative
.... 26
of their abilities.
On the other hand, some judicial opinions and some scholarly
writings acknowledge the thrall in which stereotypes have
imprisoned the legal system. These include stereotypes regarding
mental illness and dangerousness, 21 mental illness and criminality,2s
mental illness and sin,N and mental illness and evil. ° In a decision
Dunne, 590 A.2d 1174 (N.J. 1991)); Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 15, at 277-78 (discussing
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 146 (1992) (Thomas,J., dissenting)).
25. Prochaska v. Brinegar, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa 1960).
26. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
27. See Richard Gardner, Mind over Matter?: The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Be-
tween Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY LJ. 675, 677 (2000) (stating that
"[historically, treatment] for mental illnesses ranged from exorcism to even more bizarre and
often inhumane practices, such as torture or the removal of portions of the skull to allow evil
spirits to escape").
28. See Sarah Bredemeier, Hollow Verdict: Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Provokes Animus-
Based Discrimination in the Social Security Act, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 697, 732 (2000) (stating that
"animosity toward the mentally ill reaches as far back as the earliest books of the Bible, inspir-
ing myths, legends, and horror stories linking madness to God's punishment, sin, and evil.");
id. at 732 n.180.
29. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 37 (stating that "ever since Prince
Ptah-hotep attempted the first classification of mental illness almost five thousand years ago,
conceptions of such illness have been inextricably linked to the notion of sin."); Deuteronomy
28:15-28 (cursing with madness those who fail to observe all of God's commandments); Per-
lin, Sanism, supra note 4, at 388-91 (pointing to the deep-rooted misconceptions and hatred
toward the mentally ill throughout history); see also, e.g., JOHN BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND:
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 26-27 (1955) (explaining that insanity was tied to
sin, and a special class of priests were the only people capable of ridding the sinner of his
demonic possession); WOLF WOLFENSBERGER ET AL., THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN
HUMAN SERVICES 12-25 (1972) (noting that mental retardation has often been regarded as
the result of sin and God's punishment).
30. See WALTER BROMBERG, FROM SHAMAN TO PSYCHOTHERAPIST: A HISTORY OF THE
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 63-64 (1975) (discussing various historical perspectives of
mental illness); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
64-65 (1984) (examining the American and English tests for insanity--specifically knowing
the difference between good and evil-under the theory that humans become somewhat
godlike once this distinction is recognized); JUDITH S. NEAMAN, SUGGESTION OF THE DEVIL:
Olmistead
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involving a local ordinance that sought to bar the establishment of
all group homes within a town, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall wrote:
A regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation soon
emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed
paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive custodial
institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the
aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and "nearly ex-
tinguish their race." Retarded children were categorically
excluded from public schools, based on the false stereotype
that all were ineducable and on the purported need to protect
nonretarded children from them. State laws deemed the re-
tarded "unfit for citizenship."
3 1
32
But opinions such as this are rare. One recent positive example
comes from the Montana Supreme Court which stated that "[t]he
use of such stereotypical labels-which, as numerous commenta-
tors point out, helps create and reinforce an inferior second-class
of citizens-is emblematic of the benign prejudice individuals with
mental illnesses face, and which are, we conclude, repugnant to
our state constitution."3 3 Unfortunately, this in no way reflects the
standard judicial "take" on these issues.3
THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS 31, 144 (1975) (addressing the stereotype of persons with mental
illness as evil).
31. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462-63 (1985).
32. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 391-92 (discussing non-sanist opin-
ions). Decisions such as Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), and Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986), all implicitly ac-
knowledge the virulence of sanist thinking and actions. For less well-known lower court
opinions that focus on sanism issues, see PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 307-08
(discussing Waters v. Thomas, 46 E3d 1506, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995) (Clark, J., concurring &
dissenting in part); United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1009, 1021 n.30 (10th Cir.
1993); State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 649 (Conn. 1997) (Katz, J., concurring); and State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 1991)).
For recent scholarship, see, e.g., Bredemeier, supra note 28, at 730; Justine A. Dunlap, Men-
tal Health Advance Directives: Having One's Say, 89 Ky. L.J. 327, 353 (2000-01); Eric S. Janus,
Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of Police Power Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L.
297, 321 (1998); Carolee Lezuch, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Redefining "Major Life Activ-
ity" to Protect the Mentally Disabled, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1861 n. 130 (1999); Grant H. Morris,
Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 98
(1999); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Crimi-
nal Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199, 1244 (2000); Elisa Swanson, "Killers Start Sad and Crazy": Mental
Illness and the Betrayal of Kipland Kinkel, 79 OR. L. REv. 1081, 1103-10 (2001); BruceJ. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41
(1999).
33. In re Mental Health of KG.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
34. See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 4, at 400-01 (footnotes omitted) stating:
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In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),s5 and it appeared that, for the first time, there was some con-
sensus acknowledgment of the damage inflicted by generations of
mechanical adherence to mindless stereotypes.36 In 1999, the Su-
preme Court decided Olmstead v. L.C.,37 affirming an Eleventh
Circuit decision. The Eleventh Circuit had ruled that the ADA enti-
tled plaintiffs-residents of Georgia State Hospital-to treatment in
an "integrated community setting" as opposed to an "unnecessarily
segregated" state hospital. This Article considers the ADA and
Olmstead in an effort to determine the extent to which this Act and
this decision have changed or are likely to change prevailing sanist
norms.
Twice in the past I have turned to Bob Dylan's brilliant master-
piece, Idiot Wind,-" for lyrics to use in article titles dealing with the
insanity defense . 9 The searing metaphors and savage language of
that song "fit" perfectly with that topic.
In Idiot Wind, Dylan sings, "What's good is bad, what's bad is
good, you'll find out when you reach the top, You're on the bot-
tom."4 0 This leads into the question posed in this Article. The
decision in Olmstead appears to have "reached the top" in the con-
text of institutional mental disability law. But did it really? Has
Olmstead, so far, really made a difference?41 Or, are persons institu-
tionalized because of mental disability, still "on the bottom?"
[J]udges reflect and project the conventional morality of the community. Like the rest
of society, judges take refuge in flawed "ordinary common sense," heuristic reasoning
and biased stereotypes to justify their sanist decisions.... U]udicial decisions in all ar-
eas of mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. The
myths are cherished by trial judges, appellate judges, Supreme Court justices, and, es-
pecially, by the ChiefJustice of the United States.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 (1994). See Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21, at 57-58 (stating
that "the ADA provides basically the same bundle of protections for persons with disabilities
as the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s did for citizens of color with clear, strong, and enforce-
able standards").
36. See Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes
Be Undone? 8J.L. & HEALTH 15, 22 (1993-94) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanist Attitudes].
37. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
38. BOB DYLAN, LYRICS 1962-1985 367 (1985).
39. Michael L. Perlin, "Big Ideas, Images and Distorted Facts": The Insanity Defense, Genetics,
and the "Political World," in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 37 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 1999); Perlin, Borderline, supra
note 13.
40. DYLAN, supra note 38, at 367.
41. This discussion sidesteps entirely the Eleventh Amendment issues resolved in Uni-
versity of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that states have Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity in Title I ADA cases brought by state workers).
Olmstead
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The three Parts of this Article begin to answer these questions.
Part I briefly examines the state of mental disability law before the
ADA's passage and comments on the relative lack of success in
cases litigated in its wake. Part II considers the Olmstead decision
and its relative impact (or lack thereof) in the larger world of the
ADA. Part III considers the possible impact of Olmstead on sanist
attitudes displayed within the legal system. This Part suggests that
Olmstead, for all its revolutionary potential, has still raised more
questions than it has answered.
I. THE ADA
The ADA's legislative history-as it applied to persons with men-
tal disability-focused specifically on questions of stereotyping and
"reflect[ed] Congressional awareness of the pernicious danger of
stereotyping behavior."02 The legislative history relied heavily on the
language in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline43 that "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that follow from the
actual impairment." 44 Congress' inclusion in the definition of dis-
ability an individual who is regarded as being impaired 4 5
"acknowledges this teaching about the power of myths." 46
The ADA's passage was enough to excite and inspire those work-
ing in mental disability law, but that enthusiasm was tempered by
concern that the ADA might be powerless to affect sanist attitudes.
As I wrote soon after the ADA was passed, "if the ADA is to make
any true headway in restructuring the way that citizens with mental
disabilities are dealt with by society. . . it must provide a means by
which to deal frontally with ... sanist attitudes."4 7 Moreover, "unless
advocates turn their attention to these attitudinal questions, the
ADA may-in 'real life'-turn out to be little more than the last in
a long (and depressing) series of 'paper victories' for mentally ill
individuals. "4
42. Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric
Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 947,968 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Make Promises].
43. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
44. Id. at 284.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (c) (1994) (stating the "term 'disability' means, with respect to
an individual-being regarded as having such an impairment").
46. Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42, at 968.
47. Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 36, at 22.
48. Id. at 22-23. See infra text accompanying note 109.
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There was also concern that the Supreme Court would see the
ADA as little more than another in a series of "mom and apple pie"
statutes with little substance or enforcement power:
Will courts say, "No, Congress really didn't mean what it said"?
Will they say, "Well, Congress may have meant it, but only in
an aspirational way, and there's really nothing for us here"? Or
will they say, "Yes, Congress said it, Congress meant it, and,
dammit, we're gonna enforce it"?
49
Early court decisions were spotty. A handful of courts applied the
ADA boldly to cases involving municipal budget cuts that elimi-
nated community recreational programs solely for persons with
disabilities,50 and to state laws that required state hospital residents
to contribute to the costs of assigned counsel.5' The most important
case in this small universe, Helen L. v. DiDario,52 held that a state
welfare department regulation requiring certain patients to receive
services in the segregated setting of a nursing home, rather than in
their own homes, violated the ADA. 3
Helen L. is significant for several reasons. First, the Third Circuit
read the Act's antidiscrimination language expansively,54 citing con-
gressional findings that "[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities ... [and that] such forms
of discrimination ... continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.' Furthermore, it found that "the Nation's proper goals
regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of oppor-
tunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals." 56 The court read the ADA to intend
to ensure that "qualified individuals receive services in a manner
49. Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42, at 955.
50. See, e.g., Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F.
Supp. 986 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
51. See T.P. v. DuBois, 843 F. Supp. 775 (D. Mass. 1993).
52. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995). Maggie's Farm, supra note
21, at 66-67, discusses the significance of Helen L. See generally Andrew Batavia, A Right to Per-
sonal Assistance Services: "Most Integrated Setting Appropriate" Requirements and Independent Living
Model of Long Term Care, 27 AM.J. L. & MED. 17, 32 (2001); Loretta Williams, Long Term Care
After Olmstead v. L.C.: Will the Potential of the ADA's Integration Mandate Be Achieved?, 17 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 205, 218-22 (2000); Sandra Yue, A Return to Institutionalization
Despite Olmstead v. L.C. ? The Inadequacy of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement in Minnesota and the
Failure to Deliver Home- and Community-Based Waiver Services, 19 LAw & INEQ. 307, 316 (2001).
53. See 46 F.3d at 327.
54. Id. at 335.
55. Id. at 332 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (1994)).
56. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8)).
Olmstead
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consistent with basic human dignity rather than a manner which
shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them." The court further
declared that it would "not eviscerate the ADA by conditioning its
protections upon a finding of intentional or overt 'discrimina-
tion,' ,57 focusing specifically on Congress' finding that
"discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as ... institutionalization." 
s
Unfortunately, Helen L. aside, the picture, for the most part, was
bleak for persons with disabilities. A study by Professor Ruth Colker
revealed that in ADA employment cases, for example, employers
prevailed in 93% of district court cases and in 84% of court of ap-
peals cases. 59 The ADA has not yet been a panacea for all problems
faced by persons with disabilities. 6°
II. OLMSTEAD
Then the Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. L.C. 1 In her major-
ity opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stressed that
"[u]njustified isolation ... is properly regarded as discrimination
based on disability" 2 and that "undue institutionalization qualifies
as discrimination 'by reason of ... disability.' ,63
How important a decision is Olmstead? Soon after it was issued, I
wrote that Olmstead was potentially "the most important civil mental
disability law case since the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v.
Romeo 4 in 1982 .... [If] taken seriously, it may change the debate
57. Id. at 335.
58. Id. at 336.
59. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1999); see also, Kathryn Moss et al., Outcomes of Employment
Discrimination Charges Filed Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1028
(1999) (stating that 15.7% of EEOC filings brought "some kind of benefit" to individual alleg-
ing ADA discrimination). See generally SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS (2001); Susan Stefan,
The Americans with Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 131
(1999); Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to Be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, the Abusive Workplace,
and Title lof the ADA, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 795 (1998) [hereinafter Stefan, Worker Stress].
60. See, e.g., Stefan, Worker Stress, supra note 59.
61. Olmstead v. L.C. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
62. Id. at 597.
63. Id. at 597-98. See also PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 175-204 (discuss-
ing Olmstead).
64. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (finding a limited constitutional right to training for certain
persons institutionalized by reason of mental retardation). See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL




on [mental health issues], ... and perhaps most importantly, on
how we feel about persons with [mental] disabilities. '
Will Olmstead resuscitate and revitalize the constitutionally-
grounded "least restrictive alternative" (LRA) principle in mental
disability law? 66 Was it a harbinger of a sea change on the part of
the Supreme Court, or an anomalous decision that simply cannot
be harmonized with the rest of this area of law? Certainly, the other
cases decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as Olmstead,
frequently known as "the Sutton trilogy,"6 7 were seen as defeats by
ADA supporters. The decisions were hailed by those unsympathetic
to the ADA.e Was Olmstead "different" because it dealt with ques-
tions of institutionalized mental patients, thus not touching on the
employment issues at the heart of Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy?
Or did Olmstead's difference make it somehow irrelevant? Would
these cases make a difference in how the public felt about all these
issues? There can be no dispute that the ADA has spawned an as-
tonishing number of published cases. 9 Sheer numbers, however,
say little about attitudes and ultimate impacts.
A. Olmstead's Impact?
Will the explosion of ADA litigation ultimately have a substantive
and lasting impact on many of the most important questions of
mental disability law? Will Olmstead actually provide the first impor-
tant leverage in nearly a quarter of a century to bring about
important changes in how we construct mental disability and how
65. Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21, at 56.
66. See Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise": Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the
Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law? 37 Hous. L. REv. 99
(2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises of Paradise].
67. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
68. See, e.g., Susan Norton, Resolved by Supreme Court, 51 MANAGE, May 1, 2000, at 1 avail-
able at 2000 WL 28951549 (stating that "to the collective relief of employers everywhere, the
Supreme Court [decided Sutton and Murphy]").
69. On a purely personal anecdote, I wrote the first edition of a three volume mental
disability law treatise in 1989. 1 have just submitted the manuscripts to volumes four and five
of a five-volume second edition. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (1989); id., (2d ed. 1998-2000). Each summer and fall, I write a new pocket part
and supplement. I prepare to do this work by, first, dragging from my basement to my home
office a group of packing boxes that contain all the mental disability law cases (and relevant
law review articles) published in the prior year. This year, there were twenty-eight boxes. And
eighteen of these twenty-eight boxes-when they were finally sorted-were filled with cases
involving the ADA.
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we treat persons with mental disability? It is possible that Olmstead
will give us an important, new, and revolutionary tool with which to
fight sanism.7° Of course, on the other hand, it may not. Mental
disability law is strewn with examples of "paper victories,, 7' bold
pronouncements from the Supreme Court that fall are ignored at
the trial court level. By way of example, I am not sure what is more
astonishing: the fact that, 1) thirteen years after the Supreme Court
decided Jackson v. Indiana,72 one-half of the states had not imple-
mented Jackson,7s or, 2) in the decade following the revelation, the
matter remained status quo,74 or, 3) according to Westlaw, other
than the three professors who conducted this research, I am the
only law professor who has ever written about this.
75
Will it be this way with Olmstead and the ADA? Or will there be
some sort of a perceptible, measurable shift in attitudes so that the
promises of the ADA-"promises of paradise"76-- become a reality?
Several years before Olmstead, I turned to a Dylan love ballad
Love Minus Zero/No Limit,77 for the lyric "make promises by the
hour" in an effort to describe one of the then-unresolved dilemmas
of the ADA.7 Would the Supreme Court take the ADA seriously, or
would the Court respond, as it had in the first Pennhurst State School
& Hospital79 decision by eviscerating the Developmental Disabilities
Bill of Rights Act,so by delivering nothing? Olmstead answered that
70. See Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21, at 56 (stating that "Olmstead potentially has
the capacity to transform and revolutionize mental health law" (emphasis in original)).
71. Id. at 22 (quoting Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VIC-
TORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976)).
Lottman's article was one of the first published uses of this phrase in a mental disability law
context. See, e.g., Perlin, Promises of Paradise, supra note 66, at 1049; Perlin & Dorfman, Dodging
Lions, supra note 10, at 116; Paul Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God". 7iage Among Poor
Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2499 (1999).
72. 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that indefinite long-term commitment of persons
unlikely to regain their competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future is unconstitu-
tional). See generally PERLIN, DISABILITY LAw, supra note 64, § 2A-4.4, at 122-24 (2d ed. 1998)
(explaining the Jackson decision).
73. Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 6, at 23-24 (discussing and citing research pre-
sented in Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 940
(1985)).
74. See id. at 24-25 (discussing and citing research presented in Grant H. Morris & J.
Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Crimi-
nalDefendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (1993)).
75. See id. at 24.
76. See Perlin, Promises of Paradise, supra note 66.
77. Id. at 167.
78. Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42 at 958.
79. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
80. Id. at 30 (stating that the Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act was merely a
federal/state grant program and that neither the right to treatment nor the least restrictive
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question,"' but, as I see now, that was only the first important ques-
tion to be confronted.
The second, and perhaps arguably more important, question is
this: Has Olmstead, so far, really made the difference that many of us
hoped, predicted, and expected? What impact, if any, will Olmstead
have on attitudes?2 Will it begin to remediate decades (centuries?
millennia?) of sanism? Will it augur in a new regime in which issues
of stigma, exclusion, and segregation are finally taken seriously? Or,
after the post-Olmstead dust settles, will the ADA remain little more
than Idiot Wind, "blowing through the dust upon our shelves?"83
B. The ADA's Evolution
When enacting the ADA, Congress appeared to treat mental dis-
ability issues as a poor stepchild to matters dealing with physical
disability. 4 There was little legislative debate, and what there was
suggested a fairly wide gap between Congress' concerns in writing
the legislation, and the extent of discrimination faced by persons
with mental disabilities.85
To what extent could the ADA undo sanist attitudes? s6 Were
courts willing to take seriously the remarkably strong language used
by Congress in a series of fact findings that seemed to elevate ADA
inquiries into questions of equal protection law? 7 Was the ADA
alternative sections of the bill of rights were enforceable in private action). See also Perlin,
Make Promises, supra note 42, at 953, 958-59, 981.
81. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 583 (stating that "the ADA stepped up earlier efforts in the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to secure opportunities for people with developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits
of community living").
82. See generally Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21 (asking this question about the ADA
in general).
83. DYLAN, supra note 38, at 368.
84. Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 36, at 24-26.
85. Id. Most of the debate as to mental disabilities centered on the question of whether
certain sexual disorders-e.g., transvestism, transsexualism, and other "gender identity disor-
ders" would be covered. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (b)(1) (1994); see also Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra
note 36, at 25 n.53.
86. See Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 36, at 22 (stating that "if the ADA is to make
any true headway in restructuring the way that citizens with mental disabilities are dealt with
by society (by employers, public agencies, and proprietors of places of public accommoda-
tions) it must provide a means by which to deal frontally with these sanist attitudes.")
87. Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42, at 947-49. But see University of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (noting that discrimination in employment is reviewed under the
rational basis test for Equal Protection clause purposes in ADA cases).
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merely hortatory?8s Was it an example of what Justice Harlan had
described in Rosado v. Wyman8 9 ("Congress sometimes legislates by
innuendo, making declarations of policy and indicating a prefer-
ence while requiring measures that, though falling short of
legislating its goals, serve as a nudge in the preferred directions"),90
or was the Court going to give it true substance and true life?
In the pre-Olmstead years, things were happening in the courts
and on the streets. First, mentally disabled plaintiffs fared poorly in
individual employment discrimination cases.91 Second, similarly-
disabled individuals did surprisingly well, comparatively speaking,
92in institutionally-based litigation. Third, the public debate on the
ADA was limited by the grumbling op-ed critique that it is "prepos-
terous" to argue that discrimination against persons with disabilities
is equivalent to discrimination based on race,93 or that persons with
disabilities should simply be "thankful" that many facilities are ac-
cessible to them."4 The language in these columns is almost
identical to the language found in newspapers in the late nine-
teenth century, when editorial writers grumbled about how
"parasites" received undeserved governmental largesse in the form
of Civil War pensions.95
Although the ADA discourse is occasionally tempered by a heart-
warming story about how the law made a true difference by em-
powering individuals with serious disabilities, 96 negative press
88. Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42, at 955-56.
89. 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).
90. Id. at 412.
91. See Moss, supra note 59, at 1028; Stefan, Woker Stress, supra note 59, at 802.
92. See PERLIN, DISABILITY LAW, supra note 64, § 5A-2.4, at 195-96 nn.226-27 (citing
cases).
93. Paul Clark, ADA and Its Discontents: Court to Rule on Lawsuits Against States, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000, at A19.
94. Ed Miedema, Enforing the ADA Can Sometimes Go Too Far, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2000, at 20A.
95. See, e.g., Peter David Blanck, Civil War Pensions, Civil Rights, and the ADA: Empirical
Studies (1869-1907, 1990-2000), 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 109 (2001); Peter David Blanck & Michael
Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America,
52 ALA. L. REv. 1 (2000).
96. See Laura C. Scotellaro, Note, The Mandated Move From Institutions to Community Care:
Olmstead v. L.C., 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 737, 737 (2000) (footnotes omitted):
Larry McAfee, a twenty-nine year old civil engineer, became a quadriplegic as a result
of a motorcycle accident. During the four years following his accident, he was trans-
ferred from institution to institution like a "sack of potatoes." The state in which he
lived refused to pay for community-based living services for him and only paid for the
cost of nursing home care even though he was not ill and did not require any institu-
tional care. In the nursing home, he was told when to eat, when to sleep, and even
when he could watch movies on television. Because of these restrictions on his life, he
requested the right to be removed from his life-sustaining respirator. Immediately after
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anecdotes far outweigh the positive ones. Certainly, the media-
friendly Casey Martin saga has drawn more attention than all other
individual ADA cases combined.9' Fourth, the Supreme Court sent
out what could charitably be called a mixed message in its 1999 de-
cisions. The Sutton trilogy98 sharply limited the ADA in employment
cases, while Olmstead surprisingly broadened it.99 But, after all of
this, the issue of sanism remains off the radar screen of most public
debate.
When I discuss the ADA with friends and with other lawyers, a
universe that presents prototypically liberal "takes" on a variety of
social issues (race discrimination, homophobia, misogyny, etc.), two
issues emerge. First, virtually every person has a horror story about
how "unreasonable" ADA demands caused clients to go out of
business, prevented other clients from opening new offices, etc.
These criticisms mostly concern ramps and other matters involving
physical accessibility. None of these stories, on the surface at least,
appear to have anything to do with mental disability law. Second,
not a single person accepts-on any level-the argument that dis-
crimination against persons based on disability is like discrimination
based on race, religion, or sexual preference. Even friends who
have "outed" themselves and have told of their experiences in psy-
chiatric hospitals, or who have movingly shared the impact of major
depression or bipolar illness on their own lives and/or on the lives
of loved ones, refuse to take seriously my arguments that disability-
based discrimination is as pernicious, as harmful and as morally
corrupt as other types of discrimination.
Mr. McAfee was placed in a community-based setting, however, he changed his mind
about suicide.
For negative examples, see supra notes 93-94.
97. See Martin v. PGA Tour, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 532 U.S. 661 (2001)
(holding that allowing golfer with disability to use a golf cart, despite the walking require-
ment that applied to the association's tours, was not a modification that would
"fundamentally alter the nature" of those competitions and was required by Title III of the
ADA).
98. See Perlin, Promises of Paradise, supra note 66, at 1029-30 n.214 (discussing Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), and
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)); Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21, at 58
n.46 (discussing the Sutton trilogy).
99. See PERLIN, DISABILITY LAw, supra note 64, § 5A-2.4b at 219-20 (2d ed. 2000).
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III. THE RAVAGES OF SANISM
For the past decade, I have written and continue to write relent-
lessly about the ravages of sanism.'0° I have also written about the
way that stereotypes, prejudices, deindividualized thinking, and the
use of cognitive-simplifying heuristics' °1 have warped the way we
think about mental disability, about persons with mental disability,
about persons who provide mental health services to persons with
mental disabilities.0 2 It is this omnipresence of sanism-and its evil
twin, pretextuality -- that continues to temper my enthusiasm
about the ADA as a civil rights statute and Olmstead as an imple-
menting (or, perhaps, motivating) decision.
In the immediate aftermath of Olmstead, I wrote the article IAin't
Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No More.14 This article argued that
Olmstead carried with it the seeds to potentially revolutionize men-
tal disability law just as Dylan's electric (and electrifying)
performance at the 1965 Newport Folk Festival of Maggie's Farm, a
song about redemption and freedom in the context of another civil
rights struggle, revolutionized pop music.10 5 A few months later, I
wrote another piece, in an equally optimistic tone, arguing that
Olmstead could potentially cause a restructuring of major aspects of
the forensic mental health system, and Olmstead could further lead
to a major reconceptualization of how and where we conduct in-
competency-to-stand-trial and insanity evaluations. °6 A few months
later, my post-Olmstead glow begin to dim a bit. I wrote an article
100. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 21-58; Perlin, Sanism, supra note 4;
see also, Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21; Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CON. L.
REV. 407 (2000); Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 6; Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIv. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994); Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 15.
101. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 4-16; Michael L. Perlin, Psychody-
namics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 3 (1990).
102. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 440-44; Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra
note 6, at 30-31.
103. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 3, at 59-75; Perlin, Success, supra note 7; Mi-
chael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
625, 669-70 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordi-
nary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991).
104. Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21.
105. Id. at 53-55.
106. Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the Institu-
tionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193 (2000)
[hereinafter Perlin, Outlaw].
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(alluded to previously), Their Promises of Paradise,0 7 which argued
that Olmstead may potentially revitalize the least restrictive alternative
doctrine' °s in mental disability law. But, in all instances, I made
clear that none of this would be any more than ephemeral unless
we directly confronted the issue of sanist attitudes, which was the
topic of my first ADA article in 1993.'o
There is a disconnect in constitutional and statutory mental dis-
ability law that most of us have perhaps missed. There have been
no analogous attempts, so far, to answer the question that has be-
deviled civil rights activists since the 1950s:
How to capture "the hearts and minds" of the American pub-
lic so as to best insure that statutorily and judicially articulated
rights are incorporated-freely and willingly-into the day-to-
day fabric and psyche of society. Unless advocates turn their
attention to these attitudinal questions, the ADA [even after
Olmstead] may in real life turn out to be little more than the
last in a long (and depressing) series of "paper victories" for
mentally ill individuals." °
A. The Heart of Olmstead
1. Isolation as Discrimination-In Olmstead, the Supreme Court
focused on what it saw as Congressional judgment supporting the
finding that "unjustified institutional isolation of persons with dis-
abilities is a form of discrimination."'. l First, the Court considered
that institutionalization (as opposed to community-based therapy)
perpetuated "unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life."" 2 Sec-
ond, the Court concluded that confinement, "severely diminishes
107. Perlin, Promises of Paradise, supra note 66.
108. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (subsequent cita-
tions omitted). See generally PERLIN, DISABILITY LAW, supra note 64, §§ 2A-4.4a, 2A-4.4c, at
126-32, 139-42.
109. Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 21; see also Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 36.
110. Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 36, at 22-23. The "hearts and minds" phrase was
first used in ChiefJustice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954); cf.Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968).
111. Olmsteadv. L.C.,527U.S. 581 at600 (1999).
112. Id.; see also Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581
(No. 98-536).
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the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations,
social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment." 13 Yet, if the public rejects
the empirical data that drives these arguments, then the relation-
ship between the ADA, mental disabilities, and centuries of
prejudice and mistreatment will be missed.
This may be obscure to laypersons. Given the prevalence of men-
tal disability,' 4 however, it strikes me that some of this obscurity is
the result of willful ignorance ." Nevertheless, it cannot be obscure
to lawyers with any familiarity with the history of institutional and
community rights litigation in this country. The saga of institutional
mental disability law in this nation is a saga of mistreatment and of
non-treatment. As long ago as 1958, the president of the American
Psychiatric Association called the state run psychiatric facilities
"bankrupt beyond remedy."" 6 The facts of the most important insti-
tutional conditions case in history-Wyatt v. StickneyV17-are truly
stomach-turning." s As the Fifth Circuit noted in its decision, affirm-
ing the district court's order: "[One patient] died after a garden
hose had been inserted into his rectum for five minutes by a work-
ing patient who was cleaning him; one died when a fellow patient
hosed him with scalding water; another died when soapy water was
forced into his mouth; and a fourth died from a self-administered
overdose of drugs which had been inadequately secured."" 9 The
chairman of the legal action committee of the National Association
of Retarded Children characterized the facility at issue before
the court in both Youngberg v. Romeo10 and Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman [I and II]' 2 ' as "Dachau, without
113. 527 U.S. at 601; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-7, Olmstead v.
L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536).
114. See Darrel A. Regier, One-Month Prevalence of Mental Disorders in the United States, 45
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 977, 981 tbl. 4 (1988), quoted in W David Corrick, Health and
Welfare, 24 PAC. L.J. 885, 905-06 n.15 (1993) (stating that 19.6% of Americans eighteen years
old or older suffer from some form of diagnosable mental disability during their lives).
115. Cf United States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 n.7 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
951 (1976) (stating that "he suspected the fact; he realized its probability; but he refrained
from obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny
knowledge. This, and this alone, is wilful [sic] blindness").
116. Harry Solomon, Presidential Address: The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to
American Psychiatry, 115 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (1958).
117. 344 E Supp. 373 (D. Ala. 1972).
118. See 2 PERLIN, DISABILITY LAw, supra note 64, § 3A-3.1, at 24 (2d ed. 1999) (stating
that Wyatt was "one of the most influential mental disability law cases ever filed").
119. Wyattv. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974).
120. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (finding only a limited right to treatment for persons institu-
tionalized because of mental retardation).
121. 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (stating that the Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 6010) was merely a federal/state grant program and that neither the right to treat-
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ovens."'2 2 Attempts to establish small group homes for adults with
mental retardation continue to meet with "protests, lawsuits,
threats, vandalism, beatings, and fire bombings." 23 This is not a
cheery tableau.
It is not at all clear how Olmstead will be constructed by lawyers,
mental health professionals, and the general public (to the extent
that a Supreme Court case that does not involve abortion, affirma-
tive action, church-state relations, the death penalty, gay rights, or
Miranda is ever "constructed" by the general public).124 1 think, how-
ever, that the Court's language about exclusion and segregation
125
has the potential to be extremely important in that context.
That portion-and perhaps the most critical part of Olmstead-
makes two novel, interlocking points never made before by the
Supreme Court. First, the Court acknowledged that the effect of
discrimination against persons with mental disability is like the ef-
fect of discrimination against other persons who traditionally
fall within the ambit of footnote four of Carolene Products-.2
ment nor the least restrictive alternative sections of the bill of rights were enforceable in pri-
vate action); 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal relief in
a right-to-community service case due to federalism concerns).
122. LEOPOLD LIPPMAN & I. IGNANCY GOLDBERG, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 17 (1973),
quoted in Perlin, Marginalization, supra note 11, at 100 n.215.
123. Paul Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide, and Social Prjudice, 3 ISSUES L. &
MED. 141, 150 (1987). See generally MICHAEL WINERIP, 9 HIGHLAND ROAD (1994) (describing
the arduous task of establishing a group home in Glen Cove, New York).
124. See, e.g., Craig W Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family
Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage", 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1724 n.146 (1998) (hypothe-
sizing similarities between public reaction to abortion and gay rights cases); Earl Martin,
Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency of Capital Punishment, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 84, 85
(1997) (discussing death penalty); Steven K. DiLiberto, Note, Setting Aside Set Asides: The New
Standard for Affirmative Action Programs in the Construction Industry, 42 VILL. L. REV. 2039, 2047,
nn.15-16 (1997) (discussing affirmative action and abortion).
125. See Olmstead v. L.C. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1999).
126. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). For a dis-
cussion on the impact this footnote from Carlene Products has had on the development of
mental disability law, see PERLIN, DISABILITY LAw, supra note 64, § 1-2.1, at 7 (2d ed. 1998),
and Perlin, Sanism, supra note 4, at 381 n.51. I discuss this in the ADA context in Perlin, Make
Promises, supra note 42, at 948-49. Further, see Perlin, Outlaw, supra note 106, at 219-20 (foot-
notes omitted):
The language that Congress chose to use in its introductory fact-findings [for the
ADA] is of extraordinary importance. Its specific finding that individuals with disabili-
ties are a "discrete and insular minority ... subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness" is not just
precatory flag-and-apple-pie rhetoric. This language-granted "the force of law"-was
carefully chosen; it comes from the heralded "footnote 4" of the United States v.
Carlene Products case, which has served as the springboard for nearly a half century of
challenges to state and municipal laws that have operated in discriminatory ways
Olmatead
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blacks1 27 and women128 (as signified by the Court in the cases sup-
129porting the Olmstead language).
This is a major shift on the part of the Supreme Court. This
holding in Olmstead is extremely important, as it gives life to Con-
gress' findings that "individuals with disabilities are a "discrete and
insular minority ... subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness.
"13
Also, it emphasizes the legislative history that called for the aboli-
tion of "monoliths of isolated care in institutions and segregated
educational settings."'' 31 It explicitly concluded that "integration is
fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provision[s] of segre-
gated accommodations and services relegate persons with
disabilities to second-class citizen status." 32 A recent article focused
on the importance of the Carolene language:133 "[T]he statute
plainly uses the ... [phrase 'discrete and insular minority'] as con-
stitutional code words to designate an identifiable group of people
who experience a common set of obstacles to participation in pub-
lic and private life." 34
To what extent will Olmstead remove some of these obstacles?
That question remains unanswered.
2. The Extent of Discriminatory Behavior-Second, Olmstead's text
recognizes that the pernicious impact of discrimination cannot
separate institutional isolation from other discriminatory behavior.
In its reliance upon the amicus briefs of the American Psychiatric
Association and the United States, the Supreme Court integrated
the issue of isolation with issues of "family relations, social contacts,
against other minorities. The language also rejects a congressional commitment to
provide "protected class" categorization for persons with disabilities. This in turn
forces courts to employ a "compelling state interest" or "strict scrutiny" test in consid-
ering statutory and regulatory challenges to allegedly discriminatory treatment.
127. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (stating that "there can be no doubt that [stigmatizing
injury often caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most serious consequences of dis-
criminatory government action") (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).
128. See id. (stating that "'in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals be-
cause of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes'" (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) and quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
129. See sources cited supra note 113.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
131. Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Labor and Human
Res., 101st Cong. 215 (1989) (statement of former Sen. Weicker).
132. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 479.
133. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REV. 397
(2000).
134. Id. at 420.
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work options, economic independence, educational advancement,
and cultural enrichment."'"5 The Court also stressed that institu-
tionalization requires individuals to "relinquish participation in
community life [so] they could enjoy given reasonable accommo-
dations."'136 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it
"got" one of the most important structures of the ADA. That is,
questions of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization are far
broader than simply inquiries into whether a patient is "behind the
wall" (not for a moment to minimize the seriousness of that in-
quiry), and that these questions touch on virtually every important
aspect of interpersonal interaction.1
37
B. The Post-Olmstead Universe: Two Surprises
This all leads to a critical series of questions: How have lower
courts read Olmstead? Have they interpreted it expansively or nar-
rowly? Have they fleshed out some of the ambiguities? Have they
paid any particular attention to the language to which I just re-
ferred? Have they merely cited the holding as black-letter law, or
has the universe of decisions reflected the potentially revolutionary
impact of the case? Close examination of these questions leads to
two surprises: the lack of case law and the lack of scholarly response
to Olmstead.
1. Little Case Law---Somewhat surprisingly, there are few signifi-
cant post-Olmstead developments in the case law."" Lower federal
courts and state courts have cited Olmstead for the proposition that
"the ADA in fact prohibits segregation of persons with disabilities
and requires states to make reasonable efforts to place institutional-
ized individuals with disabilities into the community'1s9 in the "most
135. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Pamela Cohen, Being "Reasonable": Defining and Implementing a Right to Com-
munity-Based Care for Older Adults with Mental Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
24 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 235 (2001).
138. See Perlin, Promises of Paradise, supra note 66, at 1053-54; see also Jennifer Mathis,
Community Integration of Individuals with Disabilities: An Update on Olmstead Litigation, 25 MEN-
TAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 158, 158 (2001) (stating that "although the Olmstead
decision was of tremendous significance to the disability rights community, only a handful of
lower court decisions have interpreted its meaning").
139. Rolland v. Cellucci, 191 F.R.D. 3, 9 (D. Mass. 2000).
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integrated setting to fit their needs.' ' 40 Lower courts have also
quoted the Olmstead language that the ADA provides "a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities." 14' At least one circuit has
read Olmstead extraordinarily narrowly in a case involving in-home
safety monitoring for patients in need of personal-care services.1
2
But there are, as of yet, no cases that seriously examine the crucial
attitudinal questions that are at the core of the Olmstead decision.
Astonishingly few decisions even cite Olmstead.
14 3
2. Little Academic Literature-Even more surprising is the dearth
of important literature in the law reviews critiquing and decon-
structing Olmstead.14 4 The case is barely mentioned in Professor
Bagenstos' important recent article that urges what he character-
izes as a "subordination-focused approach" as a means of resolving
future ADA cases.1 4 5 Most optimistic of the early commentators has
been John Parry, editor of the MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY
LAW REPORTER. Parry concluded:
Of all the ADA Supreme Court decisions this term, Olmstead is
the most significant for several reasons. Fundamentally, it ex-
pands the possibilities for persons in state-run mental
institutions. Until Olmstead, the Court was suspicious of any
kind of constitutionally based right to services in the commu-
nity or least restrictive setting. In the past, the foundation of
deinstitutionalization was the absence of dangerousness to self
140. Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. Civ A 97-6610, 1999 WL 1257284, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1999). See also Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664-65 (Ind. 2000) stating
that:
Since the 1970s, Indiana law has strongly reflected policies to deinstitutionalize people
with disabilities and integrate them into the least restrictive environment. National
policy changes have led the way for some of Indiana's enactments in that several fed-
eral acts either guarantee the civil rights of people with disabilities or condition state
aid upon state compliance with desegregation and integrationist practices.
141. Kirbens v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med., 992 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Wyo. 1999).
142. Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 197 F.3d 611, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
864 (2000).
143. A simple Westlaw search reveals that Olmstead was cited twenty-nine times as of Oc-
tober 18, 2000, and forty-five times by September 1, 2001. By contrast, consider what
happened in the eighteen months after the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997), upholding that state's sexually violent predator act. See Perlin, Success, supra
note 7 (stating that there were 133 cites to Hendricks in the same time period). See generally
PERLIN, DISABILITY LAw, supra note 64, § 2A-3.3, at 75-92 (2d ed. 1998).
144. Text infra accompanying notes 144-46 is generally adapted from Perlin, Outlaw, su-
pra note 106, at 230-31.
145. Bagenstos, supra note 134, at 402.
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or others, not the appropriateness of treatment or essential
services in non-institutional settings.... The ADA's integra-
tion of service mandate, however, presented a new
opportunity for advocates to obtain appropriate community-
based services from the states, but many states argued that
Title II did not obligate them to provide such services. Now
that obligation is beyond dispute.
46
Remarkably, there are only a handful of student notes published
about Olmstead.4 7 One student predicted that, as a result of
Olmstead, "disabled individuals who have spent many years segre-
gated from society and confined to institutions will finally be placed
in community-based settings and will have the opportunity to live
independent and productive lives.' 4 s In addition, a student com-
mentator-writing generally about the relationship between mental
disability and tort liability19-noted how Olmstead brought into
"sharp focus ... the law's clear preference, in the civil rights context,
for care in the least restrictive environment.' ' 50 Another student ex-
pressed concern that "the Court was unable to arrive at a uniform
resolution of the cost issue." He saw this failure "combined with the
deference given to the States regarding which individuals are quali-
fied for community-based treatment," as potentially resulting in
"fewer mentally disabled individuals receiving proper treatment.",
5
1
On the other hand, soon after the decision, Professor Paul
Appelbaum speculated whether the initial "ecstatic" response of
mental disability advocates was premature and concluded:
146. John Parry, The Supreme Court Interprets the ADA, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 454, 456 (1999) (citing Youngblood v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307 (1987)).
147. See Rosemary L. Bauman, Note, Disability Law--Needless Institutionalization of Indi-
viduals with Mental Disabilities as Discrimination under the ADA-Olmstead v. L.C.,
30 N.M. L. REv. 287 (2000); Shoshana Fishman, Note, Olmstead v. Zimring: Unnecessary Insti-
tutionalization Constitutes Discrimination Under The Americans With Disabilities Act,
3J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 430 (2000); Joanne Karger, Note, "Don't Tread on The ADA":
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring and The Future of Community Integration For Individuals With
Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1221 (1999); Scotellaro, supra note 96.
148. Scotellaro, supra note 96, at 782.
149. See PERLIN, DISABILITY LAW, supra note 64, § 7B-1 et seq. (2d ed. 2000); see also infra
notes 150 and 151.
150. Sarah Light, Note, Reecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the Mentally
Disabled Under 7brt Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381, 391 (1999).
151. Neil S. Butler, Note, "In the Most Appropriate Setting": 77L- Rights of Mentally Disabled Indi-
viduals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Wake ofOlmstead v. L.C., 49 CATm. U. L. Rio.
1021, 1052 (2000) (stating that "only Congressional clarification of the broad scope of the ADA's
integration mandate will resolve the Court's current cost dilemma and ensure that in future
years the full range of treatment options will be available to the mentally disabled").
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[I]t is unclear to what extent the U.S. Supreme Court will
support lower courts in compelling states to create community
alternatives that do not now exist. No bright line has been
identified to separate states that can rely on the fundamental-
alteration defense from those that cannot. The reluctance of
the courts to trample on executive branch prerogatives has
always been the bugaboo of the least restrictive alternative
doctrine. Whatever else it may accomplish, the decision in
Olmstead v. L.C. is unlikely to precipitate the widespread
creation of community-based services for persons with mental
disabilities.1
2
As of the submission of this Article for publication, that is all there
has been.
C. Why the Surprises?
I want to speculate a bit on both of these surprises (the lack of
case law and the lack of literature). The first may be a bit easier.
Ever since the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Youngberg v. Ro-
meo 13-establishing a pallid "substantial professional judgment" test
as the benchmark for assessing constitutional questions about psy-
chiatric institutionalization-the incidence of institutional law
reform litigation has dropped dramatically."5 The fact that there is
152. Paul S. Appelbaum, Least Restrictive Alternative Revisited: Olmstead's Uncertain Mandate for
Community-Based Care, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1271, 1272 (1999). Cf Note, Leading Cases: Federal
Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties, 113 HARV. L. REV. 326, 332-33 (1999), stating:
In Youngberg, the Court held that, in assessing the constitutionality of the use of restraints
in mental institutions, the decision to use restraints, "if made by a professional, is pre-
sumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is
such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment." Although the Court in Olmstead avoided citing Youngberg, its deference to pro-
fessional judgment seemed to invoke the spirit of Youngberg. In the wake of Olmstead and
its explicit deference to professional judgment, institutions may simply avoid complying
with the ADA by creating cultures in which recommendations for patient community
treatment are few and far between.
153. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
154. Id. at 323. See PERLIN, DISABILITY LAw, supra note 64, § 3A-9.4, at 95-98 (2d ed.
1999).
155. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institu-
tionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption? I PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y & L. 80, 97-110 (1995) [hereinafter Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence].
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but one reference to Youngberg in Olmstead'15 is curious, and perhaps
reflects this cessation of interest. Perhaps it should not be so sur-
prising that post-Olmstead case law has been so scanty. Also, as
Olmstead was decided just two years ago, it is certainly possible that
cases currently in the pipeline have not yet percolated up to the
appellate decision level.
The second is more perplexing. When the Supreme Court de-
cides a mental disability law case, we have come to expect a cottage
industry of commentary in the law reviews, both by professors and
students. By way of contrast, within the first eighteen months of the
Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,157 there were
thirty-one law review articles about Hendricks.15s Ironically, there has
not been similar interest in the aftermath of the Olmstead case.
For years, I have bemoaned the lack of scholarly interest on the
part of law professors about mental disability law.'5 9 Perhaps the lack
of Olmstead literature reflects this. But also, perhaps, it reflects a
deeper and ironic level of sanism that says that the issues before
the Court in Olmsteadjust are not "important" or "interesting." And
maybe it is this level of pervasive and as-of-yet-non-dislodgeable san-
ism that also explains the lack of case law. Perhaps lawyers
representing potential ADA plaintiffs simply do not believe that the
Supreme Court really meant what it said in Olmstead.es Perhaps
lower courts are not convinced that the Supreme Court meant what
it said. 61 Perhaps these courts do not "buy" the critical aspects of
Olmstead that I have discussed about how discrimination against
persons with disabilities is like discrimination based on race or
156. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605, stating:
For other individuals, no placement outside the institution may ever be appropriate.
See ... Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("For many mentally retarded people, the difference between the capacity to do things
for themselves within an institution and total dependence on the institution for all of
their needs is as much liberty as they ever will know.")
157. 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 (1994)).
158. Westlaw search (Oct. 18, 2000).
159. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 4, at 406. See also Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence, su-
pra note 155, at 116. Although Hendricks may be classified as a "mental disability law case," its
focus on sexual predator law is the reason for the extensive attention paid to it.
160. This eerily tracks the fear I expressed several years ago that the Supreme Court,
when confronted with an Olmstead-type case, might have said that Congress really did not
mean what it said in enacting the ADA. Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42, at 955, and ac-
companying text. Mercifully, I was wrong.
161. Cf Perlin, Make Promises, supra note 42, at 955 (anticipating a negative reaction by
the Supreme Court to an Olmstead-like claim).
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sex.12 Nor have they "bought" how the psychological, social, and
economic costs of institutionalization are much greater and graver
than just (though my use of the word 'Just" here makes me wince)
163a loss of physical freedom . Perhaps all of this is simply another
indication of the reality that, in the long run, sanist attitudes have
really not changed that much.
CONCLUSION
In August 2000, I was asked by thisjournal's editors to participate
in this Symposium. At the time, I still basked in the afterglow of
Olmstead. When I agreed to participate, I expected that I would
write a piece celebrating Olmstead. I expected to look at yet another
area of mental disability law that might be transformed by
Olmstead-as I had done for several law school symposiums.'
6
'
So what tempered my enthusiasm in the intervening months?65
There have been no vivid, memorable, "negative" cases-the ADA
version of John Hinckley shooting Ronald Reagan'---that resulted
in the type of saturation publicity that would be sure to bring ADA
repeal to the forefront of the next Congressional agenda. Perhaps
what happened is that I sat down and studied the entire post-
Olmstead universe, what little there is of it. What is depressing is not
so much what was said, but what wasn't said.
It is true that very few of the post-Olmstead cases are overfly hos-
tile to persons with mental disabilities. Moreover, none of them
engage in the "I-can't-believe-he-said-that" level of stereotyping
about such persons that has been reflected in other areas of mental
disability law.6 7 That is a good thing. On the other hand, however,
162. See supra text accompanying note 62 (discussing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597).
163. See supra text accompanying note 63 (discussing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597-98).
164. Thomas Cooley Law School symposium (on the potentially revolutionary potential
of Olmstead), the University of Alabama symposium (on the relationship between the post-
Olmstead ADA and forensic incompetency/insanity evaluations and commitments) and the
University of Houston symposium (on how the post-OlmsteadADA might resuscitate the prin-
ciple of the "least restrictive alternative" in mental disability law).
165. I did not become that much older, or crankier. I am also studiously avoiding any
consideration of the decision in Garrett, see supra note 41.
166. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 278-81, 333-48; see also Perlin, Half-
Wracked, supra note 6, at 12. See generally PERLIN, DISABILITY LAW, supra note 64, § 1-2.3, at 24
(2d ed. 1998) (discussing the impact of the Hinckley acquittal on mental disability law).
167. See, e.g., Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 15, at 257 n.98 (citing Battalino v. People, 199
P.2d 897, 901 (Colo. 1948) (finding that the defendant was not insane where there was no
evidence of a "burst of passion with paleness, wild eyes and trembling"), quoted in Michael L.
Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity DefenseJurisprudence, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 599, 727 n.608 (1990)); Perlin, Right to Sex, supra note 7, at 538-39 (stating that
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very few of the cases are bold. Or visionary. Or reflect the type of
quantum leap that we have come to experience, not infrequently,
in other areas of mental disability law, both civil and criminal.'G,
The reality is that the post-Olmstead universe of cases is pretty pal-
lid and uninspired. My sad conclusion is that, a decade after the
passage of the ADA and in spite of Olmstead, many sanist attitudes
still need to be undone. While Olmstead was a first major step, the
path is still a long and winding one.
In Idiot Wind, Dylan sings, "What's good is bad, what's bad is
good, you'll find out when you reach the top, You're on the bot-
tom."' I chose this Dylan line to begin the title of this paper very
specifically and carefully, because I believe it mirrors, almost per-
fectly, my frustration over the way the ADA continues to be read in
post-Olmstead times. Hopefully, what's "good" does not turn out to
be "bad," and we are not "on the bottom." Unfortunately, I am just
not sure. Because I am not sure, I cannot yet say with confidence
that the Americans with Disabilities Act is anything more than
"Idiot Wind," . . . "blowing through the flowers on your tomb."' 70 I
truly hope that subsequent developments answer these questions in
a positive way, and that, to conclude from the same song, "in the
final end [we win] the wars/After losin' every battle."17'
"in one parental rights termination case, In re McDonald, 201 N.W2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1972),
expert testimony that persons with disabilities cannot show love and affection as well as per-
sons of normal intelligence was relied upon to support termination findings").
168. See e.g., Perlin & Dorfman, Dodging Lions, supra note 10, at 115 (discussing the shift
in the path of the right to refuse treatment litigation after the trial decisions and "since the
trial decisions in Rennie v. Klein and Rogers v. Okin first articulated a limited constitutional
right to refuse, a flood of court decision[s] from state and federal courts in practically every
jurisdiction in the nation have tinkered with the contours of the right"). The discussion in
Dodging Lions traces the Rennie case (Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), stay
denied in part, granted in part, 481 F Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F. 2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982)) and the Rogers case
(Rogers v. Okin, 478 E Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F. 2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980) (en
banc), vacated sub nom Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982)).
169. DYLAN, supra note 38, at 367.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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